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0. Introduction 
 
There is a widespread assumption that B-theorists (according to whom there is nothing 
metaphysically special about the present moment in virtue of which it is present) should 
interpret tense operators such as ‘it was the case that’ and ‘it will be the case that’ as implicit 
quantifier-restrictors – so that, for example, an utterance at the present instant n of the 
sentence ‘It was the case that there are dinosaurs’ is true just in case there are dinosaurs 
located at some instant t earlier than n. However, it is easy to show that this interpretation of 
the tense operators creates serious problems for B-theorists when combined with certain other 
natural B-theoretic commitments. In this paper, I argue that the best way for B-theorists to 
avoid these problems is to treat the tense operators as redundant when the sentences in their 
scope are qualitative – roughly, not about any particular individual.  
 The paper is structured as follows: in §1, I describe the B-theory. In §2, I show how 
the standard interpretation of the tense operators as quantifier-restrictors creates problems for 
B-theorists. I also describe the well-known analogous problem for Modal Realists (according 
to whom there is nothing metaphysically special about the actual world in virtue of which it is 
actual). In §3, I show that B-theorists can avoid these problems by rejecting the standard 
interpretation of the tense operators as quantifier-restrictors in favour of the view that the 
tense operators are redundant when the sentences in their scope are qualitative. I then 
describe and respond to what I take to the most serious objection to this view, namely, that it 
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has highly implausible consequences given the B-theory. Finally, in §4 I describe four 
alternative B-theoretic strategies for avoiding the problems generated by the standard 
interpretation of the tense operators. I argue that there are good reasons for B-theorists to 
reject each of these alternative strategies. I conclude that B-theorists should prefer the 
strategy described in §3.  
 
1. The B-theory  
 
The B-theory of time is often characterized informally as the view that ‘time is like space’, 
that ‘all times are on a par’, that ‘time does not flow’, and that ‘tense is unreal’.1 While there 
is something to be said for each of these slogans, we can make more progress by focusing on 
a single, clear, core B-theoretic thesis. A good candidate for such a thesis is: 
  
TEMPORAL PARITY: There is nothing metaphysically special about the present 
 instant in virtue of which it is present2 
 
Temporal Parity is a thesis about the nature of the present instant n: it implies that being 
present doesn’t metaphysically distinguish n from other instants. Temporal Parity doesn’t 
imply that there’s nothing special about n, or indeed nothing metaphysically special about n – 
for example, it is consistent with Temporal Parity that n is God’s favourite instant, and 
                                                
1 Contemporary B-theorists include Beer (2010), Deng (2013), Sider (2001), and Skow (2015).  
2 I assume that there are such things as instants (or moments) of time – ‘instants’ for short. Most contemporary 
B-theorists identify instants with regions of the spacetime manifold –  in particular, maximal hyperlanes of 
simultaneity (‘hyperplanes’ for short). See, for example, Sider (2001) and Skow (2015). Strictly speaking, for B-
theorists something is an instant only relative to a frame of reference – given the Special Theory of Relativity, 
there is no non-frame-relative foliation of spacetime into hyperplanes. For ease of exposition, in what follows I 
write as if there are instants simpliciter according to the B-theory, as this makes no important difference to the 
arguments. 
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therefore (plausibly) metaphysically special relative to every other instant. But even if n is 
God’s favourite instant, given Temporal Parity, that is not what makes n present.  
What does make n present according to the B-theory? The best way to answer this 
question is to ask a different but closely related question: what does ‘the present instant’ 
mean given the B-theory? According to the standard B-theoretic account, ‘the present instant’ 
is an indexical term like ‘here’, and means the same as ‘this instant’ – it refers directly to the 
instant of utterance on any occasion of use. It follows that given the B-theory, an assertive 
utterance at the present instant n of the sentence ‘n is the present instant’ expresses the 
proposition that n = n. In that sense, for B-theorists the question ‘What makes this instant the 
present instant?’ is like the question ‘What makes this place here?’ – just as there is nothing 
metaphysically special about this place in virtue of which it is here, there is nothing 
metaphysically special about this instant in virtue of which it is present.   
B-theorists defend Temporal Parity. A-theorists, in contrast, defend Temporal 
Disparity:  
 
TEMPORAL DISPARITY: There is something metaphysically special about the present 
instant in virtue of which it is present 
 
However, A-theorists disagree among themselves about what makes the present instant 
metaphysically special. For example, many Presentists identify instants with maximal, 
consistent, sometime-true propositions, and hold that the metaphysical specialness of the 
present instant consists of its being true.3 Among non-Presentist A-theorists, some hold that 
the present instant is the instant than which there is no later; some that it is the instant that 
                                                
3 See, for example, Bourne (2006), Crisp (2007) and Markosian (2004).  
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instantiates fundamental presentness; and some that it is the accurate instant, where an 
instant t is accurate iff for all propositions p, p is true at t iff p is true simpliciter.4  
We saw above that according to the standard B-theoretic account, the predicate ‘is the 
present instant’ as uttered at the present instant n expresses the property of being identical to 
n. Notice that the property of being identical to n is a permanent property – a property that is 
never gained or lost over time – and therefore that according to the standard B-theoretic 
account, the proposition that n is the present instant is a permanent proposition: a proposition 
that is if true, always true.5 In contrast, consider the A-theorist, according to whom n is 
present in virtue of possessing some metaphysically special property F (such as being true or 
being accurate). For the A-theorist, F had better be a temporary (indeed, instantaneous) 
property of instants – otherwise, she is open to the charge of defending a view according to 
which ‘the present is frozen’. Hence, if the A-theory is true, there is at least one temporary 
proposition – namely, the proposition that n is F – and A-theorists must accept the thesis of 
Propositional Temporalism: 
  
PROPOSITIONAL TEMPORALISM: Some propositions are sometimes true and 
sometimes false 
 
                                                
4 The first view is held by some defenders of the Growing Block Theory such as Broad (1923); the second view 
is held by some Moving Spotlight Theorists such as Deasy (2015); the third view is held by e.g. Bacon 
(forthcoming, Noûs).			
5 In what follows, for ease of exposition I assume a Platonist view of properties and propositions. Nothing of 
argumentative importance rests on this.  
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B-theorists, on the other hand, invariably reject Propositional Temporalism in favour of 
Propositional Eternalism, the view that all propositions are permanent:6,7  
 
 PROPOSITIONAL ETERNALISM: Every proposition is if true always true 
 
For example, according to the standard B-theoretic account, the sentence 
  
(1) ‘It is raining in Carrigaline’ 
 
as uttered at the present instant n expresses the permanent proposition that it is raining in 
Carrigaline at n. Moreover, given that Temporal Disparity implies Propositional 
Temporalism, it follows that Propositional Eternalism implies Temporal Parity.  
 Temporal Parity and Propositional Eternalism are core B-theoretic theses. Is there 
more to being a B-theorist?  According to Sider (2001, 13-14), the B-theory implies 
‘reductionism about tense’, the thesis that ‘tokens of tensed sentence types… can be given 
tenseless truth-conditions’. What exactly does this mean? Think of a ‘tensed sentence type’ as 
a sentence-type whose natural regimentation is in the language of Quantified Tense Logic 
(QTL). QTL is the result of adding tense operators such as ‘P’ – pronounced ‘it was the case 
that’ – and ‘F’ – pronounced ‘it will be the case that’ – to standard first-order predicate logic. 
                                                
6 Some B-theorists argue that many of our beliefs have temporary contents that can be represented by functions 
from instants to truth-values, or from instants to permanent propositions – see e.g. Sider (2001, 20-1) and 
Zimmerman (2005). However, whatever these ‘temporary contents’ are, they cannot be temporary propositions 
in the sense I have in mind here. For one thing, temporary propositions have truth-values simpliciter – but 
functions from instants to truth-values do not (at best, they have truth-values relative to instants). Moreover, if 
there are temporary propositions, there is an accurate instant (a unique instant t such that for all propositions p, 
p is true at t iff p is true simpliciter). But if an instant t is accurate, then t is plausibly metaphysically distinct 
from all other instants in virtue of being the present instant, in violation of Temporal Parity. (This argument is 
due to Dorr, Counterparts MS). See also Russell (forthcoming, Noûs). 
7 Schaffer (2012, 8) defines ‘eternalism’ as the thesis that ‘all propositions are fully time-specific’. If this means 
(assuming a structured theory of propositions) that all propositions have instants or intervals as constituents, 
then Schaffer’s ‘eternalism’ is distinct from Propositional Eternalism, and moreover, is not a thesis B-theorists 
have any obvious reason to accept.  
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Given ‘P’ and ‘F’, we can define the further tense operators ‘H’ (‘it always has been the case 
that’), ‘G’ (‘it is always going to be the case that’), ‘A’ (‘it is always the case that’) and ‘S’ 
(‘it is sometimes the case that’) as follows:  
 
H𝜑 =def ¬P¬𝜑 
 
G𝜑 =def ¬F¬𝜑 
 
A𝜑 =def H𝜑 ⋀ 𝜑 ⋀ G𝜑 
 
S𝜑 =def P𝜑 ⋁ 𝜑 ⋁ F𝜑 
 
For example, the sentence  
 
 (2) There used to be dinosaurs 
 
is a tensed sentence – it is naturally regimented in QTL as follows (where ‘D’ expresses the 
property of being a dinosaur): 
 
(3) P∃xDx 
 
A simple way to understand the claim that tensed sentences such as (2) can be given 
‘tenseless truth-conditions’ is as the claim that sentences such as (2) express (relative to 
contexts of utterance) permanent propositions. In that case, ‘reductionism about tense’ 
follows straightforwardly from Propositional Eternalism. However, for most B-theorists, 
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there is more to ‘reductionism about tense’ than Propositional Eternalism. For example, 
consider the sentence  
 
 (4) Sometimes, there are dinosaurs 
 
(4) is a tensed sentence in the sense described above – it is naturally regimented in QTL as 
follows:  
 
(5) S∃xDx 
 
Moreover, the proposition that sometimes, there are dinosaurs is a permanent proposition. 
However, B-theorists standardly reject the claim that the relevant ‘tenseless truth condition’ 
for (4) is that sometimes, there are dinosaurs. The reason is that when B-theorists say that 
tensed sentences such as (2) and (4) can be given ‘tenseless truth-conditions’, what they 
typically mean is that the truth-conditions for such sentences can be stated in a language that 
is entirely free of tense operators. Insofar as B-theorists take this language to be more 
‘metaphysically perspicuous’ than QTL, this reflects a B-theoretic commitment to the thesis 
of Anti-temporalism: 
 
 ANTI-TEMPORALISM:  Tense operators are metaphysically non-fundamental8 
 
For example, here is Sider (2011, 24): 
                                                
8 Note that Anti-temporalism neither implies nor is implied by Propositional Eternalism. For example, in the 
left-to-right direction, Deasy (2015) defends a view that combines Anti-temporalism with Propositional 
Temporalism. In the right-to-left direction, one could (for example) defend a view that combines Propositional 
Eternalism with the thesis that the tense operator ‘S’ is metaphysically fundamental.  
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Spatializers [B-theorists] do not admit tense operators into their fundamental ideology, since they can 
describe temporal reality without them – by quantifying over past and future entities and predicating 
features of them relative to times. Spatializers may use tense operators in their nonfundamental 
languages, since they can give a metaphysical semantics for the language of quantified tense logic in 
their tense-operator-free fundamental language. 
 
In other words, ‘reductionism about tense’ implies that the truth-conditions for tensed 
sentences such as (2) and (4) can in principle be stated in a ‘fundamental language’ that is 
both free of tense operators (given Anti-temporalism) and all of whose sentences express – 
relative to contexts of utterance – permanent propositions (given Propositional Eternalism). It 
follows that the relevant ‘tenseless truth-condition’ for sentence (4) cannot be that sometimes, 
there are dinosaurs. More generally, it follows that for B-theorists, QTL is ‘metaphysically 
second-rate’, as it contains expressions – in particular, tense operators such as ‘P’ and ‘F’ – 
which fail to ‘carve reality at the joints’. However, as Sider indicates in the above quotation, 
this does not mean that B-theorists can simply bypass QTL. Rather, an important part of the 
B-theoretic project is to provide (as Sider 2011 puts it) a ‘metaphysical semantics’ for QTL in 
the B-theorist’s fundamental, tense operator-free language. The question of how best to do 
this – and in particular, of how to interpret the tense operators when the sentences in their 
scope are not about any particular individuals – is at the heart of this paper. 
 
2. Locator  
 
Consider the following characterization of the B-theory (‘eternalism’) due to Sider (2006, 77-
8): 
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For the eternalist, past- and future-tensed claims are ultimately made true by claims that quantify over 
past and future times and entities. For instance, an assertion of ˹It was the case that φ˺ is true iff φ is 
true at some time located before the assertion. Construing (2) [‘Dinosaurs once existed’] (somewhat 
artificially) as having this form, the eternalist thinks of (2) as amounting to:  
  (2E) There exist dinosaurs, located temporally before us.                                          
  ∃x(Dx&Bxu) 
 Note that (2E) entails that there exist dinosaurs (∃xDx). Presentists, on the other hand, deny that past-
 tense statements give way to statements quantifying over past entities. Rather, such statements involve 
 primitive, unanalyzeable tense operators. The presentist’s rendition of (2) is this: 
  (2P) It was the case that: there exist dinosaurs.                                                         
  P∃xDx  
‘P’ symbolizes the past-tense operator it was the case that. (Other tense operators include it will be the 
 case that, and it is always the case that.) Inside the scope of such a tense operator, the existential 
 quantifier is not existentially committing; that is why  the truth of (2P) is consistent with presentism. 
 
According to Sider, if the sentence ‘Dinosaurs once existed’ is regimented as 
 
(3) P∃xDx 
 
then given the B-theory, (3) ‘amounts to’ – i.e. express the same state of affairs as – the 
sentence (where ‘T’ expresses the property of being an instant; ‘<’ expresses the precedence 
relation between instants; ‘n’ names the present instant; and ‘L’ expresses the location-
relation between instants and their occupants): 
 
(6) ∃x(Tx ⋀ x<n ⋀ ∃y(Dy ⋀ L(y,x)))  
(Informally: There are dinosaurs located at a past instant) 
 
10 
	
Why think this? Sider assumes that given the B-theory, the tense operator ‘P’ functions as an 
implicit quantifier over instants which restricts the individual quantifiers (e.g. the ‘existential’ 
quantifier ‘∃x’) in its scope to things located at the relevant instant. As Sider puts it in the 
passage quoted above: ‘an assertion of ˹It was the case that φ˺ is true iff φ is true at some time 
located before the assertion’. Hence the unrestricted ‘existential’ quantifier ‘∃x’ in sentence 
(3) is restricted in sentence (6) to things located at some instant earlier than now. Similarly, 
here is Sider (2011, 241): 
 
Spatializers [B-theorists] may use tense operators in their nonfundamental languages, since they can 
give a metaphysical semantics for the language of quantified tense logic in their tense-operator-free 
fundamental language. Such a semantics will, for example, count an utterance of P∃xDx that takes 
place at t0 as being true iff some dinosaur is located before t0.  
 
It seems clear from the above that for Sider, the B-theory implies (or at least, ought to be 
combined with) the following analyses of the tense operators ‘P’ and ‘F’ (where ‘[φ]x’ is read 
as equivalent to φ but with all quantifiers in φ restricted to the occupants of x):9 
 
Pφ := ∃x(Tx ⋀ x<n ⋀ [φ]x) 
(Informally: For it to be the case that it was that φ is for it to be the case that, 
restricting attention to things located at some past instant t, φ) 
 
Fφ := ∃x(Tx ⋀ n<x ⋀ [φ]x) 
(Informally: For it to be the case that it will be that φ is for it to be the case that, 
restricting attention to things located at some future instant t, φ) 
                                                
9 In the following ‘𝜑	:= 𝜓’ is to be read ‘for it to be the case that 𝜑 is for it to be the case that 𝜓’. 
11 
	
 
Given the standard definitions of the tense operators ‘S’ and ‘A’ in terms of ‘P’ and ‘F’ (see 
§1 above), these analyses imply: 
 
Sφ := ∃x(Tx ⋀ [φ]x) 
(Informally: For it to be the case that sometimes, φ is for it to be the case that, 
restricting attention to things located at some instant t, φ) 
 
Aφ := ∀x(Tx ⊃	[φ]x) 
(Informally: For it to be the case that always, φ is for it to be the case that, restricting 
attention to things located at any instant t, φ) 
 
More generally, Sider appears to assume that the B-theory implies (or ought to be combined 
with) the following thesis: 
 
LOCATOR: The standard tense operators (‘P’, ‘F’, ‘S’ and ‘A’) are implicit quantifiers 
over instants which restrict the explicit individual quantifiers (‘∀’ and ‘∃’) in their 
scope to things located at the relevant instant(s) 
 
The assumption that the B-theory implies (or ought to be combined with) Locator seems to be 
widespread in contemporary philosophy of time, even if it is seldom explicitly stated.10 And it 
is easy to see why this assumption is made: as we saw in §1 above, B-theorists are committed 
to providing a ‘metaphysical semantics’ for sentences such as  
                                                
10 In addition to the evidence from Sider (2001, 2011) cited above, see Marshall (2016, 8).  
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(3) P∃xDx 
 
in their fundamental, tense operator-free language – and Locator provides a natural way of 
reductively analysing the tense operators that appear in such sentences.  
However, while Locator seems to work well for sentences such as (3), it causes 
serious problems when applied to certain other sentences. For example, we can define what it 
is for two things to be instantmates as follows: 
 
INSTANTMATES: ∀x∀y (x and y are instantmates =def ∃zTz ⋀ L(x,z) ⋀ L(y,z)) 
 
In short, for two things to be instantmates is for there to be some instant at which they are 
both located. Now, most B-theorists accept that some things are not instantmates, such as 
Napoleon and Queen Elizabeth II – i.e. that there are (quantifying unrestrictedly) non-
instantmates: 
 
NON-INSTANTMATES: There are non-instantmates 
 
Moreover, most B-theorists accept the tense-logical rule that one can always validly infer 
‘Sometimes, 𝜑’ from ‘𝜑’, or informally, that whatever is the case is sometimes the case: 
 
SOMETIMES INTRODUCTION: φ ⊃ Sφ11 
(Informally: Whatever is the case is sometimes the case) 
                                                
11 Given the inter-definability of ‘S’ and ‘A’ (S𝜑 =def ¬A¬𝜑; A𝜑 =def ¬S¬𝜑), Sometimes Introduction is 
equivalent to the rule A𝜑⊃𝜑.  
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Sometimes Introduction is the temporal analogue of the widely accepted modal axiom T, 
according to which (informally) whatever is the case is metaphysically possible: 
 
T: φ ⊃ ◊φ12 
(Informally: Whatever is the case is metaphysically possible) 
 
Non-instantmates and Sometimes Introduction jointly imply 
 
(7) Sometimes, there are non-instantmates 
 
But given Locator, (7) implies 
 
(8) There is an instant t such that there are non-instantmates located at t 
 
which implies a contradiction given the above definition of ‘non-instantmate’.  
Similarly, most B-theorists hold that there are (quantifying unrestrictedly) many 
instants of time. Call this thesis Times: 
 
 TIMES: There are many instants 
 
Given Sometimes Introduction, Times implies 
 
 (9) Sometimes, there are many instants 
                                                
12	Given the inter-definability of ‘♢’ and ‘◻’ (♢𝜑 =def ¬◻¬𝜑; ◻𝜑 =def  ¬♢¬𝜑), T is equivalent to the rule ◻𝜑⊃𝜑.	
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And given Locator, (9) implies 
 
(10) There is an instant t such that there are many instants located at t 
 
However, given that for any instants t and t*, t is located at t* iff t = t*, (10) implies a 
contradiction. In short, it appears that Locator is inconsistent with some other very natural B-
theoretic commitments. 
The problems for B-theorists arising from an acceptance of Locator and theses such as 
Non-instantmates and Times should be familiar to those acquainted with the ‘advanced 
modalizing’ debate concerning the correct interpretation of the modal operators ‘♢’ 
(pronounced ‘it is metaphysically possible that’) and ‘◻’ (pronounced ‘it is metaphysically 
necessary that’) given David Lewis’s (1986) Modal Realism.13 For example, Modal Realists 
accept that there are (quantifying unrestrictedly) many possible worlds:14 
 
WORLDS: There are many possible worlds 
 
But they also accept the modal analogue of Locator – call it M-Locator –  and therefore 
accept the following analyses of ‘♢’ and ‘◻’ (where ‘W’ expresses the property of being a 
possible world and ‘[φ]x’ is read as equivalent to φ but with all quantifiers in φ restricted to 
the inhabitants of x): 
 
                                                
13 On this debate, see especially Divers (1999, 2002 §4.3, 2014), Dorr (Counterparts MS), Jago (2016), 
Marshall (2016), Noonan (2014), Parsons (2012), and Williamson (2013, 16-17). 
14 Lewis (1986) identifies possible worlds with maximal mereological sums of spatiotemporally interrelated 
individuals.  
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♢φ := ∃x(Wx ⋀ [φ]x) 
(Informally: For it to be the case that it is metaphysically possible that φ is for it to be 
the case that, restricting attention to things located in some possible world w, φ) 
 
◻φ := ∀x(Wx ⊃	[φ]x) 
(Informally: For it to be the case that it is metaphysically necessary that φ is for it to 
be the case that, restricting attention to things located in any possible world w, φ) 
 
Given T, Worlds implies: 
 
 (11) Possibly, there are many possible worlds 
 
But given M-Locator, (11) implies: 
 
 (12) There is a possible world w such that there are many possible worlds located in w 
 
which implies a contradiction given that for any worlds w and w*, w is located in w* iff w = 
w*. In short, it seems that M-Locator is inconsistent with some other very natural Modal 
Realist commitments. (Consider also the sentence ‘There are things such that there is no 
possible world in which they are both located’). 
 We have seen that Locator causes serious problems for B-theorists when applied to 
sentences such as  
 
(9) Sometimes, there are many instants 
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just as M-Locator causes serious problems for Modal Realists when applied to sentences such 
as 
 
 (11) Possibly, there are many possible worlds 
 
These problems should come as no surprise. The standard B-theoretic analyses of the tense 
operators as expressed by Locator are designed to handle tense operators as they appear in the 
QTL-regimentations of ordinary tensed sentences such as 
 
(2) There used to be dinosaurs 
 
But they are not designed to handle tense operators as they appear in sentences such as (9) 
above, in which the operators are applied to the unrestrictedly quantified sentences which B-
theorists use to express their particular view of temporal reality. Similarly, the standard 
Modal Realist analyses of the (metaphysical) modal operators as expressed by M-Locator are 
designed to handle the modal operators as they appear in the regimentations into Quantified 
Modal Logic (QML) of ordinary modal sentences such as  
 
 (13) There could be blue donkeys 
 
But they are not designed to handle modal operators as they appear in sentences such as (11) 
above, in which the operators are applied to the unrestrictedly quantified sentences which 
Modal Realists use to express their particular view of modal reality.15 
                                                
15 Why not simply replace ‘T’ in the Locator-theoretic analyses of the tense operators and ‘W’ in the M-Locator-
theoretic analyses of the modal operators with ‘T*’ and ‘W*’ respectively, where ‘T*’ expresses the property of 
being a fusion of instants and ‘W*’ expresses the property of being a fusion of possible worlds? I consider this 
strategy in §4.2 below.  
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3. Redundancy 
 
The question of how Modal Realists should address the problems generated by M-Locator 
has received far more attention than the analogous question of how B-theorists should 
address the problems generated by Locator.16 In §4 below, I describe some well-known 
answers to the modal question due to Divers (1999, 2002), Bricker (2001), and Parsons 
(2012). However, the aim of this paper is to make progress on the temporal question, by 
defending a certain answer to that question. The answer is straightforward: B-theorists should 
reject Locator in favour of the view that the standard tense operators ‘P’ and ‘F’ are 
redundant when the sentences within their scope are qualitative – roughly, not about any 
particular individual (more on this below). Call this thesis Redundancy:17   
 
REDUNDANCY: For any qualitative sentence φ, Pφ and Fφ are equivalent to φ 
 
Given the standard definitions of the tense operators ‘S’ and ‘A’ in terms of ‘P’ and ‘F’ (see 
§1 above), Redundancy implies that for any qualitative sentence φ, Sφ and Aφ are equivalent 
to φ.  
Redundancy clearly provides B-theorists with a solution to the problems generated by 
Locator. For example, given that Non-instantmates is a qualitative sentence – i.e. it is not 
about any particular individual – it follows given Redundancy that the tense operator in the 
sentence 
                                                
16 I am not aware of any published work that focuses primarily on the temporal question. Dorr (Counterparts 
MS) addresses the temporal question but prioritises the modal question, and Marshall (2016) mentions the 
temporal question but otherwise focuses on the modal question.   
17 Dorr (Counterparts MS) argues that B-theorists should accept Redundancy. However, note that Dorr’s 
defence of the thesis is distinct from that presented here.  
18 
	
 
(7) Sometimes, there are non-instantmates 
 
is redundant, and therefore that (7) is equivalent to Non-instantmates. Similarly, given that 
Times is a qualitative sentence – i.e. it is not about any particular individual – it follows given 
Redundancy that the tense operator in the sentence  
 
(9) Sometimes, there are many instants 
 
is redundant, and therefore (9) is equivalent to Times.  
 Similarly, call the view that the standard modal operators ‘♢’ and ‘◻’ are redundant 
when the sentences within their scope are qualitative M-Redundancy: 
 
M-REDUNDANCY: For any qualitative sentence 𝜑, ♢𝜑 and ◻𝜑 are equivalent to 𝜑18 
  
M-Redundancy clearly provides Modal Realists with a solution to the problems generated by 
M-Locator. For example, given that Worlds is a qualitative sentence – it is not about any 
particular individual – it follows given M-Redundancy that the modal operator in the 
sentence 
 
(11) Possibly, there are many possible worlds 
 
is redundant, and therefore that (11) is equivalent to Worlds. 
                                                
18 Noonan (2014) argues that Modal Realists should accept M-Redundancy.  
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Returning to the temporal case, it is worth pausing to make a couple of points about 
Redundancy. First, Redundancy relies on the notion of a qualitative sentence, characterized 
above as a sentence that is not about any particular individual. But what is it for a sentence to 
be about a particular individual? Following Bacon (forthcoming, Philosophical Studies), let 
us say that a qualitative proposition is a proposition that is not about any particular 
individual, and a proposition that is not qualitative is haecceistic. For example, the 
proposition that Xanthippe was wise is a haecceistic proposition, as it is about the particular 
individual Xanthippe, but the proposition that someone was wise is a qualitative proposition, 
as it is not about any particular individual. Then we can say that a qualitative sentence is a 
sentence that expresses a qualitative proposition, and a haecceistic sentence is a sentence that 
expresses a haecceistic proposition.  
However, some might not find this answer very satisfying, on the grounds that we 
have simply replaced the question of what it is for a sentence to be about a particular 
individual with the question of what it is for a proposition to be about some particular 
individual. As Bacon (ibid, 3) points out, given a metaphysics of propositions according to 
which propositions are structured entities with (monadic or polyadic) relations and particular 
individuals as literal constituents, we could say that a proposition p is about a particular 
individual a just in case p has a as a constituent, and is not about any particular individual – 
i.e. is qualitative – just in case p has no particular individuals as constituents. However, as 
Bacon also points out, some theorists prefer a more coarse-grained theory of propositions 
according to which, for example, the propositions p ⋁ q and ¬(¬p ⋀ ¬q) are identical. Such 
theorists may simply have to take the notion of a proposition’s being about a particular 
individual as primitive, understanding it via examples such as the propositions that Xanthippe 
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was wise (which is about Xanthippe) and the proposition that someone was wise (which is 
not about any particular individual).19   
An alternative approach is to try to avoid talk of ‘aboutness’ altogether, and instead 
characterise qualitative sentences in linguistic terms. For example, we might say that a 
qualitative sentence is a sentence that is free from ‘singular’ (or ‘directly referential’) terms 
like proper names, demonstratives, and free variables; or a sentence that is built entirely from 
quantifiers, logical connectives, and ‘non-singular’ predicates. But what exactly is a ‘singular 
term’, and what exactly is a ‘non-singular predicate’? Unless we are willing to use notions 
like aboutness, it may be that the best way to understand these notions is simply via 
examples: for example, ‘is a donkey’ is a non-singular predicate, but ‘is French’ is not, as it is 
equivalent to the predicate ‘is from France’, which contains the singular term ‘France’. 
Second, Redundancy obviously tells us nothing about how B-theorists should 
interpret the standard tense operators when the sentences in their scope are haecceistic (i.e. 
express propositions about particular individuals). For example, consider the sentence: 
 
 (14) Obama used to be a lawyer 
 
Typically, B-theorists hold that (14) reduces to something like (where ‘a’ names Obama): 
 
(15) ∃x(Tx ⋀ x<n ⋀ Lawyer(a,x)) 
(Informally: Obama is a lawyer at some past instant) 
 
                                                
19 As Bacon (ibid, 3-4) points out, even if the notion of a proposition’s being qualitative is taken as primitive, 
‘we can nonetheless connect it to other related concepts, thus widening the circle of analysis’.  
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However, this is not the end of the story: exactly what it is according to the B-theory for 
Obama to be a lawyer at some past instant will depend on which theory of persistence B-
theorists accept.20 Briefly, on an Endurantist account, (15) is made true by the fact that there 
is an instant t earlier than n such that Obama bears the permanent lawyer-at relation to t; on a 
Perdurantist account, (15) is made true by the fact that there is an instant t earlier than n such 
that there is an instantaneous temporal part21 of Obama which is a lawyer and is located at t; 
and on a temporal counterpart-theoretic account, (15) is made true by the fact that there is an 
instant t earlier than n such that there is a temporal counterpart22 of Obama which is a lawyer 
and which is located at t. Whichever theory is preferred, however, it remains the case that B-
theorists typically interpret the tense operators in a haecceistic sentence like (14) as non-
redundant.  
 Given as we have seen that Redundancy provides a relatively simple and elegant 
solution to the problems generated by Locator, it is natural to wonder why the view is not 
standardly accepted by B-theorists. A plausible reason is that Redundancy implies Qualitative 
Permanentarianism: 
 
QUALITATIVE PERMANENTARIANISM: For any qualitative sentence 𝜑, 𝜑	⊃A𝜑 
 
But as we saw above, the B-theory is standardly taken to imply the truth of the sentence 
 
(6) ∃x(Tx ⋀ x<n ⋀ ∃y(Dy ⋀ L(y,x)))  
(Informally: There are dinosaurs located at a past instant) 
                                                
20 See especially Haslanger & R. M. Kurtz (2006) for discussion of theories of persistence. 
21 Following Sider (2001, 59) we can say that some x is an instantaneous temporal part of some y at instant t iff 
(i) x is located at and only at t; (ii) x is part of y at t; and (iii) x overlaps at t everything that is part of y at t.	
22 A temporal counterpart of Obama is an instantaneous object that resembles Obama in relevant respects. See 
Hawley (2001) for a defence of temporal counterpart theory (‘the stage view’). 
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which implies 
 
(16) ∃xDx23 
(Informally: There are (quantifying unrestrictedly) dinosaurs) 
 
But given Qualitative Permanentariansm, (16) implies 
 
(17) A∃xDx 
(Informally: It is always the case that there are dinosaurs) 
 
And – so the objection goes – (17) is implausible (or ‘counterintuitive’). For example, here is 
Marshall (2016, 11) on the analogous modal case (where ‘(3)’ refers to the sentence 
‘◻∃xBx’ – to be read ‘Necessarily, there are blue swans’ – and ‘QR modal realism’ refers to 
the conjunction of Modal Realism and M-Redundancy): 
 
(3), however, is highly implausible, since, even if there are blue swans as modal realists claim, surely 
there might have been no such entities. The claim that it is necessary that there is a blue swan 
somewhere in the pluriverse of L-worlds (given there is in fact a blue swan in this pluriverse) is prima 
facie no more plausible than the claim that it is necessary that there is an alien creature somewhere in 
our universe (given there is in fact an alien creature somewhere in our universe). Even if there are alien 
creatures on some planet in our universe, it is surely merely contingent that there are such creatures. 
Similarly, even if there are blue swans in some L-world in the pluriverse, it is surely merely contingent 
that there are such swans. Hence, it is highly plausible that, contra QR modal realism, it is not 
necessary that there is a blue swan.  
                                                
23 See e.g. Sider (2011, 241): ‘thus he [the B-theorist] accepts “There are dinosaurs”, ∃xDx’.  
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Call the conjunction of the B-theory and Redundancy the RB-theory. An analogous objection 
to the RB-theory would run: ‘(17) is highly implausible, since, even if there are dinosaurs as 
B-theorists claim, surely there are sometimes no such entities. The claim that there are always 
dinosaurs somewhere in the spacetime manifold (given there is in fact a dinosaur in the 
manifold) is prima facie no more plausible than the claim that there are always alien creatures 
somewhere in our universe (given there is in fact an alien creature somewhere in our 
universe). Even if there are alien creatures on some planet in our universe, it is surely only 
sometimes the case that there are such creatures. Similarly, even if there are dinosaurs in 
some region of the manifold, it is surely only sometimes the case that there are dinosaurs.’ 
Call this objection to the RB-theory the Implausibility Objection.24 A more general version of 
the objection is simply that the RB-theory implies that there is no de dicto change (i.e. change 
in qualitative states of affairs), and it is highly implausible that there is no de dicto change; 
therefore, we have a good reason to reject the RB-theory.  
 I think that RB-theorists can provide a convincing response to the Implausibility 
Objection. The first point to make is that judgements of plausibility typically depend on one’s 
antecedent theoretical commitments, and even simply on the sorts of views and theoretical 
considerations to which one is routinely exposed. For example, a person with little exposure 
to the B-theory might find (16) (‘∃xDx’) utterly implausible – but sufficient time spent in the 
company of B-theorists might cause her to find the sentence quite plausible. Similarly, a B-
theorist who is used to interpreting the tense operators in line with Locator will find the 
sentence 
 
                                                
24 Jago (2016, 4) raises a similar objection to Divers’s (1999, 2002) proposed interpretation of the standard 
modal operators. See §4.1 below.  
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(18) S¬∃xDx 
(Informally: Sometimes, there are no dinosaurs) 
 
highly plausible – but sufficient time spent in the company of RB-theorists might cause her to 
find the sentence implausible.25  
Indeed, even in the absence of Redundancy, the truth of a sentence like (17) can be 
seen as plausible given the B-theory. In particular, there is a very natural sense in which, 
given the B-theory, reality as a whole does not change. But unrestricted quantification – the 
kind of quantification used in the sentence  
 
(16) ∃xDx  
 
– is quantification over all of reality. Therefore, B-theorists should not expect there to be any 
change in the state of affairs expressed by (16). But if there is no change in the state of affairs 
expressed by (16) – and tense operators are a means of capturing change or its absence – then 
it is natural for B-theorists to accept that there are (quantifying unrestrictedly) always 
dinosaurs, and therefore that (17) is true.  
The idea that (17) is true given the B-theory can be made even more plausible by 
focusing on some of the typical B-theoretic commitments that ‘fit’ very naturally with the 
truth of (17). For example, as we saw above in §1, the B-theory is typically taken to imply 
Propositional Eternalism, the view that every proposition is if true always true. But given 
                                                
25 Note that the claim here is not that B-theorists who find the negation of (18) – i.e. (17) – implausible must be 
confusing that sentence with the false sentence ‘There are dinosaurs located at every instant’. One might clearly 
distinguish those sentences and still find (17) implausible. The claim is simply that sufficient exposure to the 
RB-theory can come to make (17) seem plausible. 
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Propositional Eternalism, it follows that the proposition that there are dinosaurs is always 
true. So, the B-theory implies: 
 
(19) It is always a fact that there are dinosaurs26  
 
But it seems strange (even if it is consistent) to hold that it is always a fact that there are 
dinosaurs, but it is not always the case that there are dinosaurs. Given the truth of (19), the 
truth of (17) seems quite natural. Similarly, as we saw above, the B-theory is typically taken 
to imply the truth of (16) (‘∃xDx’). Given Propositional Eternalism, it follows that whenever 
anyone assertively utters (16), they express a truth. But it seems strange (even if it is 
consistent) to hold that whenever anyone assertively utters the sentence ‘∃xDx’ they express 
a truth, but it is not always the case that there are dinosaurs. Given that whenever anyone 
assertively utters the sentence ‘∃xDx’ they express a truth, the truth of (17) seems quite 
natural. Finally, even B-theorists who reject Redundancy typically accept that the standard 
tense operators are redundant when the sentences in their scope are qualitative but the 
individual quantifiers in their scope are already explicitly restricted to the inhabitants of some 
instant. For example, the B-theory is typically taken to imply: 
 
(20) A∃x(Tx ⋀ ∃yDy ⋀ L(y,x)) 
(Informally: Always, there are dinosaurs located at some instant) 
 
                                                
26 ‘Fact’ here just means ‘true proposition’.  
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But it seems strange (even if it is consistent) to hold that it is always the case there are 
dinosaurs located at some instant, but it is not always the case that there are dinosaurs. Given 
the truth of (20), the truth of (17) seems quite natural. 
	 A second response that RB-theorists can make to the Implausibility Objection is to 
point out that while they are committed to the truth of (17), they are not thereby committed to 
the claim that anyone who assertively utters the sentence 
 
 (21) There used to be dinosaurs, but there are none now 
 
expresses a contradiction – they can still make good sense of ordinary tensed talk. In 
particular, the reading of (21) on which it expresses a contradiction given Redundancy is one 
on which the quantifiers are read as unrestricted. However, it is commonplace that much 
quantification in ordinary thought and speech is implicitly restricted. For example, RB-
theorists can interpret the quantifiers in an ordinary assertive utterance of (21) as implicitly 
restricted to the inhabitants of this planet, so that the sentence is read as having the form 
(where ‘e’ refers to this planet and ‘Hx’ means ‘x is inhabited by dinosaurs’): 
 
 (22) PHe ⋀ ¬He 
(Informally: This planet was inhabited by dinosaurs, but now it isn’t) 
 
Given the RB-theory, the tense operator ‘P’ in the left-hand conjunct of (22) can be 
interpreted as non-redundant, as the sentence in its scope (‘He’) is haecceistic – it expresses a 
proposition about Earth. Similarly, consider the sentence  
 
 (23) Dinosaurs don’t always exist 
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RB-theorists are not committed to the claim that anyone who assertively utters (23) expresses 
a falsehood. For example, RB-theorists can interpret the quantifier in an ordinary assertive 
utterance of (23) as restricted to the inhabitants of this planet (as in (22)), so that the sentence 
expresses the true proposition that Earth isn’t always inhabited by dinosaurs: 
 
(24) ¬AHe 
(Informally: Earth isn’t always inhabited by dinosaurs) 
 
The general lesson here is that RB-theorists are not significantly worse off than B-theorists 
who accept Locator when it comes to making sense of ordinary tensed talk – all they require 
is the commonplace idea that quantification in ordinary thought and speech is often implicitly 
restricted. After all, even B-theorists who accept Locator need to account for the truth of 
ordinary utterances of sentences like 
  
 (25) Dinosaurs don’t exist 
 
given that they accept the truth of (16). They typically do this by interpreting the quantifier in 
an ordinary assertive utterance of (25) as restricted to things located at the present instant n, 
so that (25) expresses the true proposition that there are no dinosaurs located at n. 
Finally, RB-theorists can draw attention to the fact that, like B-theorists who accept 
Locator, they accept Anti-temporalism, the thesis that the tense operators are metaphysically 
non-fundamental. Therefore, although RB-theorists hold that sentences (16) (‘∃xDx’) and 
(17) (‘A∃xDx’) are logically equivalent, like B-theorists who accept Locator, they deny that 
(16) and (17) provide equally ‘metaphysically perspicuous’ ways of expressing the relevant 
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state of affairs. More generally, the question of whether B-theorists should accept 
Redundancy is not a question concerning the truth of some sentence of the B-theorist’s 
fundamental, tense operator-free language. RB-theorists are in complete agreement with B-
theorists who accept Locator concerning the fundamental facts.27 Among other things, this 
means that when it comes to describing fundamental temporal reality, RB-theorists have 
exactly the same expressive resources as B-theorists who accept Locator. For example, while 
the sentence 
 
(18) S¬∃xDx 
(Informally: Sometimes, there are no dinosaurs) 
 
is false given the RB-theory, the following sentence is, of course, true: 
 
(26) ∃x(Tx ⋀ ¬∃yDy ⋀ L(y,x)) 
(Informally: There is an instant at which there are no dinosaurs) 
 
In this case, the only relevant implication for B-theorists of accepting Redundancy is that (18) 
is not equivalent to (26). But the non-equivalence of these sentences given Redundancy 
would hardly be a good reason for rejecting the view, given that it provides a simple and 
elegant solution to the problems generated by Locator.  
 I have described what I take to be a convincing B-theoretic response (or rather, set of 
responses) to the Implausibility Objection. (Modal Realists can make analogous responses to 
the analogous objection.) I hope that this has strengthened the case for a B-theoretic 
                                                
27 This in no way implies that the dispute is not important. For example, if RB-theorists denied that e.g. what is 
the case always will have been the case (𝜑	⊃	GP𝜑), that would be a good reason for rejecting the view. 
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acceptance of Redundancy as a solution to the problems generated by Locator. But there is 
more to be said, because accepting Redundancy is not the only way for B-theorists to avoid 
the problems generated by Locator. In the next section, I assess some potentially attractive 
alternative strategies available to B-theorists. In the end, I conclude that the best strategy 
available to B-theorists for dealing with the problems generated by Locator is to reject 
Locator in favour of Redundancy. 
 
4. Alternatives 
 
In this section I consider four alternative strategies available to B-theorists for avoiding the 
problems generated by Locator. The first three, like the strategy defended in §3 above, 
involve the rejection/modification of Locator. They are: endorsing the temporal analogue of 
Divers’s (1999, 2002) analyses of the modal operators (§4.1); endorsing the temporal 
analogue of Bricker’s (2001) analyses of the modal operators (§4.2); and endorsing the 
temporal analogue of Parsons’s (2012) analyses of the modal operators (§4.3). The fourth 
strategy involves rejecting Sometimes Introduction (§4.4). In each case, I argue that there are 
good reasons for B-theorists to prefer the strategy of rejecting Locator in favour of 
Redundancy.  
 
4.1 Divers’s Strategy 
 
As Divers (1999, 228, fn.9; 2002, 47, fn.14) points out, David Lewis (1986) seems to have 
been aware of the potential for the interpretation of the modal operators as quantifier-
restrictors (i.e. for an acceptance of M-Locator) to generate problems for Modal Realism. In 
particular, Lewis writes (1986, 6):  
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Two qualifications concerning our restrictive modifiers. (1) I do not suppose that they must restrict all 
quantifiers in their scope, without exception… ‘At some small worlds, there is a natural number too big 
to measure any class of individuals’ can be true even if the large number that makes it true is no part of 
the small world. 
 
Lewis’s point seems to be that Modal Realists should allow that for certain sentences, the 
modal operator ‘At possible world w’ does not have the expected world-restricting effect on 
the quantifiers in its scope. Similarly, it is natural to think that the modal operator in the 
sentence  
 
 (11) Possibly, there are many possible worlds28 
 
does not have the expected world-restricting effect on the quantifiers in its scope, so that (11) 
is equivalent to Worlds; and similarly for the sentence  
 
 (27) Necessarily, there are many possible worlds 
 
The question is, for which sentences should Modal Realists hold that the modal operators fail 
to restrict the quantifiers in their scope (and are therefore redundant)? Divers (1999, 2002) 
argues that Modal Realists should hold that the standard modal operators ‘♢’ and ‘◻’ are 
redundant when the sentences within their scope are ‘extraordinary’, where an extraordinary 
sentence is one whose subject matter is things not all of which are located in a single possible 
world. As Divers (2002, 50) puts it: 
                                                
28 (11) is an example of what Divers (1999, 219) calls ‘advanced modalizing’.  
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GR [Modal Realism] appeals to the extraordinary interpretation of modal claims [i.e. treats the standard 
modal operators as redundant] whenever she [the Modal Realist] intends or interprets the non-modal 
content as content that is not world-restricted content.  
 
In other words, Divers argues that Modal Realists should accept the following analyses of the 
standard modal operators (where an ordinary sentence is a sentence that is not 
extraordinary):29 
 
♢𝜑 := (𝜑 is ordinary ⋀	∃x(Wx ⋀ [𝜑]x)) ⋁ (𝜑 is extraordinary ⋀ 𝜑) 
(Informally: For it to be the case that it is metaphysically possible that 𝜑 is for it to be 
the case that either 𝜑 is an ordinary sentence and restricting attention to things 
located in some possible world w, 𝜑, or 𝜑 is an extraordinary sentence and 𝜑) 
 
◻𝜑 := (𝜑 is ordinary ⋀ ∀x(Wx ⊃ [𝜑]x)) ⋁ (𝜑 is extraordinary ⋀ 𝜑) 
(Informally: For it to be the case that it is metaphysically necessary that 𝜑 is for it to 
be the case that either 𝜑 is an ordinary sentence and restricting attention to things 
located in any possible world w, 𝜑, or 𝜑 is an extraordinary sentence and 𝜑) 
 
It is easy to see that Divers’s analyses provide Modal Realists with a way of avoiding the 
problems generated by M-Locator described in §2 above: for example, given that Worlds is 
                                                
29 Note that Divers (2014) rejects the reading of Divers (2002) according to which the argument there is that 
Modal Realists should treat the standard modal operators as redundant when applied to a certain kind of 
sentence, in favour of a reading according to which the argument is that Modal Realists should treat the 
operators as redundant in cases where it is charitable to Modal Realism to do so (see especially Divers 2014, 
868). Marshall (2016, 17ff) interprets the latter strategy as implying that ‘possibly’ and ‘necessarily’ are 
ambiguous, and objects to the strategy on those grounds.  
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an extraordinary sentence, it follows given Divers’s analyses that (11) and (27) above are 
both equivalent to Worlds.  
For that reason, B-theorists might be tempted to respond to the problems for their 
view generated by Locator by rejecting Locator in favour of the following Divers-inspired 
analyses of the standard tense operators (where a temporally extraordinary sentence is one 
whose subject matter is things such that there is no instant at which they are all located – i.e. 
non-instantmates in the sense of §2 above – and a temporally ordinary sentence is a sentence 
that is not temporally extraordinary): 
 
P𝜑 := (𝜑 is temporally ordinary ⋀ ∃x(Tx ⋀ x<n ⋀ [φ]x)) ⋁ (𝜑 is temporally 
extraordinary ⋀ 𝜑) 
(Informally: For it to be the case that it was that φ is for it to be the case that either φ 
is a temporally ordinary sentence and restricting attention to things located at some 
past instant t, φ, or 𝜑 is a temporally extraordinary sentence and 𝜑)	
 
F𝜑 := (𝜑 is temporally ordinary	⋀ ∃x(Tx ⋀ n<x ⋀ [φ]x)) ⋁ (𝜑 is temporally 
extraordinary	⋀ 𝜑) 
(Informally: For it to be the case that it will be that φ is for it to be the case that either 
φ is a temporally ordinary sentence and restricting attention to things located at some 
future instant t, φ, or 𝜑 is a temporally extraordinary sentence and 𝜑) 
 
Given the standard definitions of the tense operators ‘S’ and ‘A’ in terms of ‘P’ and ‘F’ (see 
§1 above), these analyses imply: 
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Sφ := (𝜑 is temporally ordinary ⋀ ∃x(Tx ⋀ [φ]x)) ⋁ (𝜑 is temporally extraordinary ⋀ 𝜑) 
(Informally: For it to be the case that sometimes, φ is for it to be the case that either φ 
is a temporally ordinary sentence and restricting attention to things located at some 
instant t, φ, or 𝜑 is a temporally extraordinary sentence and 𝜑)	
 
Aφ := (𝜑 is temporally ordinary ⋀	∀x(Tx ⊃ [φ]x)) ⋁ (𝜑 is temporally extraordinary ⋀ 𝜑) 
(Informally: For it to be the case that always, φ is for it to be the case that either φ is 
a temporally ordinary sentence and restricting attention to things located at any 
instant t, φ, or 𝜑 is a temporally extraordinary sentence and 𝜑)	
 
Call these the Extraordinary Analyses of the standard tense operators. It is clear that the 
Extraordinary Analyses avoid the problems for B-theorists generated by Locator. For 
example, given that Times is a temporally extraordinary sentence – its subject matter is things 
such that there is no instant at which they are all located – it follows given the Extraordinary 
Analyses that the sentence 
  
(9) Sometimes, there are many instants 
 
is equivalent to Times.  
 Both the Extraordinary Analyses and Redundancy provide similar strategies for 
avoiding the problems for B-theorists generated by an acceptance of Locator. The key 
difference concerns the kind of sentences for which the standard tense operators are treated as 
redundant: temporally extraordinary sentences in the case of the Extraordinary Analyses, and 
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qualitative sentences in the case of Redundancy. Moreover, both strategies face the 
Implausibility Objection: in particular, given that according to the B-theory there is no instant 
at which all dinosaurs are located, the sentence  
 
(16) ∃xDx 
 
is a temporally extraordinary sentence, and therefore given the Extraordinary Analyses 
implies 
 
(17) A∃xDx 
 
The question, then, is whether there is any good reason for B-theorists to prefer Redundancy 
to the Extraordinary Analyses. In fact, there is: given certain standard tense-logical 
principles, the interpretation of the standard tense operators as redundant when applied to 
temporally extraordinary sentences gives rise to serious problems for B-theorists.  
To see this, let us first shift to the modal case, and consider the following pair of 
sentences (where ‘a’ names me; ‘S’ expresses the property of being a sibling; ‘R’ expresses 
the relation of being located in the same possible world; and ‘b’ names some particular 
located in a possible world other than this one):30 
 
 (28) ♢¬Sa 
 (Informally: I could have failed to be a sibling) 
 
                                                
30 This objection is due to Marshall (2016, 17, fn.43).  
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 (29) ◻(Sa ⋀ ¬Rab) 
(Informally: Necessarily, I am a sibling and it’s not the case that I am located in the 
same possible world as b) 
 
Given the standard modal principles that (i) if ◻(𝜑 ⋀  𝜓) then ◻𝜑	and (ii) if ◻𝜑 then ¬♢¬𝜑, 
(28) and (29) are inconsistent. However, notice that the sentence 
 
 (30)  Sa ⋀ ¬Rab 
 
is an extraordinary sentence in Divers’s sense: it is a sentence whose subject matter is things 
not all of which are located in a single possible world. It follows that on Divers’s analyses of 
the standard modal operators, the modal operator in (29) is redundant, and therefore (29) is 
equivalent to (30). And given that (30) is true given Modal Realism – it is true that I am a 
sibling and it’s not the case that I am located in the same possible world as b – it follows that 
on Divers’s analyses of the standard modal operators, (29) is true given Modal Realism. But 
as (28) is also true given Modal Realism, it follows that on Divers’s analyses of the standard 
modal operators, given Modal Realism (28) and (29) are both true. However, as we saw 
above, (28) and (29) are inconsistent. This is clearly a very bad result for Divers’s analyses.31  
Now let us return to the temporal case. Consider the following pair of sentences 
(where ‘a’ names me; ‘S’ expresses the property of being a sibling; ‘R*’ expresses the 
relation of being an instantmate; and ‘b*’ names some non-instantmate of mine, e.g. 
Xanthippe): 
 
                                                
31 See Divers & J. Parry (2017) for a possible response to this sort of objection.  
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 (31) S¬Sa 
 (Informally: Sometimes, I am not a sibling) 
 
 (32) A(Sa ⋀ ¬R*ab*) 
(Informally: Always, I am a sibling and there is no instant at which b and I are co-
located) 
 
Given the standard tense-logical principles that (i) if A(𝜑 ⋀  𝜓) then A𝜑 and (ii) if A𝜑 then 
¬S¬𝜑, (31) and (32) are inconsistent. However, notice that the sentence 
 
 (33)  Sa ⋀ ¬R*ab* 
 
is temporally extraordinary: it is a sentence whose subject matter is things such that there is 
no instant at which they are all located. It follows that on the Extraordinary Analyses, the 
tense operator in (32) is redundant, and therefore (32) is equivalent to (33). And given that 
(33) is true given the B-theory – it is true that I am a sibling and there is no instant at which b 
and I are co-located – it follows that on the Extraordinary Analyses, (32) is true given the B-
theory. But as (31) is also true given the B-theory, it follows that on the Extraordinary 
Analyses, given the B-theory (31) and (32) are both true. However, as we saw above, (31) 
and (32) are inconsistent. This is clearly a very bad result for the Extraordinary Analyses. 
Moreover, note that B-theorists who accept Redundancy do not face this problem, as (33) is 
not a qualitative sentence – it expresses a proposition about particular individuals (me and b) 
– and therefore it does not follow given Redundancy that (32) is equivalent to (33), and 
therefore that (32) is true. It follows that B-theorists who accept Redundancy can defend an 
interpretation of (32) on which it is false, for example, by accepting a temporal-counterpart 
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theoretic account of persistence and arguing that (32) implies the false claim that all of my 
temporal counterparts are siblings.32  
 
4.2 Bricker’s Strategy 
 
As Lewis (1986, 71) points out, Modal Realism implies that ‘island universes’ – universes 
with spatiotemporally disconnected parts – are metaphysically impossible. The reason is 
straightforward: given M-Locator, the sentence (where ‘Ux’ means ‘x is an island universe’) 
 
 (34) ♢∃xUx 
 (Informally: Possibly, there is an island universe) 
 
is equivalent to 
 
(35) ∃x(Wx ⋀	∃y Uy ⋀ L(y,x)) 
(Informally: There is an island universe located in some possible world) 
 
But given the Modal Realist thesis that possible worlds are maximal mereological sums of 
spatiotemporally connected individuals, (35) implies a contradiction. Bricker (2001) argues 
that Modal Realists can account for the possibility of island universes by rejecting M-Locator 
in favour of the following analyses of the modal operators (where ‘Fx’ means ‘x is a fusion of 
possible worlds’): 
 
                                                
32 See Hawley (2001) for a defence of a version of temporal counterpart theory (‘stage theory’). See also Lewis 
(1968, 1971) on modal counterpart theory.  
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◊φ := ∃x(Fx ⋀ [φ]x) 
(Informally: For it to be the case that it is metaphysically possible that φ is for it to be 
the case that, restricting attention to things located in some fusion of possible worlds 
f, φ) 
 
◻φ := ∀x(Fx ⊃ [φ]x) 
(Informally: For it to be the case that it is metaphysically necessary that φ is for it to 
be the case that, restricting attention to things located in any fusion of possible worlds 
f, φ) 
 
Given Bricker’s analyses, (34) is not equivalent to (35) but to the true sentence  
 
(36) ∃x(Fx ⋀	∃y Uy ⋀ L(y,x)) 
(Informally: There is an island universe located in some fusion of possible worlds) 
 
Moreover, Bricker’s analyses provide Modal Realists with a way of avoiding the problems 
generated by M-Locator described in §2: for example, given Bricker’s analysis of ‘◊’, the 
sentence  
  
 (11) Possibly, there are many possible worlds 
 
is equivalent to the true sentence  
 
 (37) There are many possible worlds located at some fusion of possible worlds 
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For that reason, B-theorists might be tempted to respond to the problems for their view 
generated by Locator by rejecting Locator in favour of the following Bricker-inspired 
analyses of the standard tense operators (where ‘Ix’ means ‘x is an interval of time’): 
 
Pφ := ∃x(Ix ⋀ x<n ⋀ [φ]x) 
(Informally: For it to be the case that it was that φ is for it to be the case that, 
restricting attention to things located at some past interval i, φ) 
 
Fφ := ∃x(Ix ⋀ n<x ⋀ [φ]x) 
(Informally: For it to be the case that it will be that φ is for it to be the case that, 
restricting attention to things located at some future interval i, φ) 
 
Given the standard definitions of the tense operators ‘S’ and ‘A’ in terms of ‘P’ and ‘F’ (see 
§1 above), these analyses imply: 
 
Sφ := ∃x(Ix ⋀ [φ]x) 
(Informally: For it to be the case that sometimes, φ is for it to be the case that, 
restricting attention to things located at some interval i, φ) 
 
Aφ := ∀x(Ix ⊃[φ]x) 
(Informally: For it to be the case that always, φ is for it to be the case that, restricting 
attention to things located at any interval i, φ) 
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Call these the Interval Analyses of the standard tense operators. It is clear that the Interval 
Analyses avoid the problems for B-theorists generated by Locator – for example, given the 
Interval Analyses, the sentence  
  
(9) Sometimes, there are many instants 
 
is equivalent to the true sentence  
 
 (38) There are many instants located at some interval of time 
 
Moreover, the Interval Analyses avoid the Implausibility Objection: given the Interval 
Analyses, the sentence  
 
(17) A∃xDx 
 
is equivalent to the false sentence 
 
(39) ∀x(Ix ⊃∃y Dy ⋀ L(y,x)) 
(Informally: There are dinosaurs located at every interval of time) 
 
(I do not think this is really an advantage of the Interval Analyses, as I think that the truth of 
(17) is in fact plausible given the B-theory, for the reasons described in §3 above. However, 
judgements of plausibility vary, and I am aware that many will judge the truth of (17) to be 
implausible given the B-theory. So, let us count the falsehood of (17) given the Interval 
Analyses as an advantage of that strategy.)  
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 We have seen that the Interval Analyses provide B-theorists with a solution to the 
problems generated by Locator that also avoids the Implausibility Objection. It might seem, 
therefore, that B-theorists should prefer the Interval Analyses to Redundancy. However, B-
theorists who endorse the Interval Analyses face the temporal analogue of a well-known 
problem faced by Modal Realists who endorse Bricker’s analyses of the standard modal 
operators.33 
The problem arises from the fact that on the standard B-theoretic account, a sentence 𝜑 is true simpliciter just in case 𝜑 is true relative to the instant of utterance t of 𝜑. So, for 
example, according to the standard B-theoretic account, an ordinary (restricted) utterance at 
the present instant n of the sentence 
 
(25) Dinosaurs don’t exist 
 
is true simpliciter, as it is true that there are no dinosaurs located at n. However, given the 
Interval Analyses, there is pressure on B-theorists to revise the standard account of truth 
simpliciter for sentences. In particular, here is Bricker (2001, §3.3) on the modal case: 
 
Suppose I assert: “Island universes exist.” On the semantical framework that underlies the Amended 
Analysis [i.e. Bricker’s analyses of the standard modal operators], the truth or falsity of my utterance is 
to be evaluated relative to a class of worlds. But which class? The world at which my utterance occurs 
belongs to many classes of worlds, and without absolute actualization there is nothing to choose 
between them. I consider three options. (1) Stay as close as possible to the old method according to 
which the truth or falsity of an utterance is evaluated relative to the world at which the utterance 
occurs. On the new semantical framework, this becomes: my utterance, “island universes exist,” is true, 
simpliciter, if and only if it is true at the singleton whose sole member is the world at which my 
                                                
33 See Bricker (2001), Jago (2016, §7), and Divers (2002, 103-105) for relevant discussion.  
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utterance occurs; otherwise, false, simpliciter. But, then, on semantical grounds alone, my utterance is 
false, simpliciter, since it is false at any singleton world. So, if we combine the Amended Analysis with 
option (1), we have it that my utterance is both contingently possible and analytically false. Not a 
happy combination.  
 
An analogous problem arises for B-theorists who accept both the Interval Analyses and the 
standard account of truth simpliciter for sentences. For example, consider the sentence ‘There 
is an extended interval of time’: given the standard account of truth simpliciter for sentences, 
a current utterance of this sentence is false on semantic grounds alone; but given the Interval 
Analyses, it is true that sometimes, there is an extended interval of time.  
The natural way for B-theorists who endorse the Interval Analyses to avoid this 
problem is to revise the standard B-theoretic account of truth simpliciter for sentences, so that 
a sentence 𝜑 is true simpliciter just in case 𝜑 is true relative to some interval i that contains 
the instant of utterance of 𝜑. However, this leads to bad results. For example, consider 
sentence (25) above. If a sentence 𝜑 is true simpliciter just in case 𝜑 is true relative to some 
interval i that contains the instant of utterance of 𝜑, then an ordinary (restricted) utterance of 
(25) at the present instant n is both true simpliciter and false simpliciter, as there is an interval 
i that contains n and contains dinosaurs, and another interval i* (distinct from i) that contains 
n but does not contain dinosaurs.  One way to avoid this result would be to further revise the 
definition of truth simpliciter for sentences, so that a sentence 𝜑 is true simpliciter just in case 𝜑 is true relative to every interval i that contains the instant of utterance of 𝜑. But then an 
ordinary (restricted) utterance of (25) at the present instant n is false simpliciter, as it is false 
that every interval i that contains n contains dinosaurs. However, this is clearly a bad result, 
as we would expect an ordinary (restricted) utterance of (25) at the present instant n to be 
true. 	
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Bricker’s solution to the modal analogue of the above problem is to combine his 
‘island-universe-friendly’ analysis of the standard modal operators with the thesis that some 
possible world or fusion of possible worlds possesses the primitive property of actuality. An 
analogous B-theoretic solution would be to combine the Interval Analyses with the thesis that 
some interval – plausibly, some instant – possesses the primitive property of presentness. But 
in that case, there would be something metaphysically special about the present instant in 
virtue of which it is present, and therefore Temporal Parity would be false. And given as we 
saw above in §1 that Temporal Parity is an essential B-theoretic thesis, that would be 
equivalent to rejecting the B-theory. Hence, B-theorists cannot accept this solution to the 
problem generated by the Interval Analyses. 
 
4.3 Parsons’s Strategy 
 
Parsons (2012) argues that Modal Realists should respond to the problems generated by M-
Locator by rejecting M-Locator in favour of the following ‘T-preserving Analyses’ of the 
modal operators: 
 
◊φ := ∃x(Wx ⋀ [φ]x) ⋁ φ 
(Informally: For it to be the case that it is metaphysically possible that φ is for it to be 
the case that restricting attention to things located in some possible world w, φ, or φ) 
 
◻φ := ∀x(Wx ⊃ [φ]x) ⋀ φ 
(Informally: For it to be the case that it is metaphysically necessary that φ is for it to 
be the case that restricting attention to things located in any possible world w, φ, and 
φ) 
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It is easy to see that Parsons’s analyses provide Modal Realists with a way of avoiding the 
problems generated by M-Locator described in §2 above: for example, given the above 
analysis of ‘◊’, the sentence  
  
 (11) Possibly, there are many possible worlds 
 
is equivalent to Worlds. For that reason, B-theorists might be tempted to respond to the 
problems for their view generated by Locator by rejecting Locator in favour of the following 
Parsons-inspired analyses of the standard tense operators: 
 
Pφ := ∃x(Tx ⋀ x<n ⋀ [φ]x) ⋁	φ 
(Informally: For it to be the case that it was that φ is for it to be the case that 
restricting attention to things located at some past instant t, φ, or φ) 
 
Fφ := ∃x(Tx ⋀ n<x ⋀ [φ]x) ⋁	φ 
(Informally: For it to be the case that it will be that φ is for it to be the case that 
restricting attention to things located at some future instant t, φ, or φ) 
 
Given the standard definitions of the tense operators ‘S’ and ‘A’ in terms of ‘P’ and ‘F’ (see 
§1 above), these analyses imply: 
 
Sφ := ∃x(Tx ⋀ [φ]x) ⋁	φ 
(Informally: For it to be the case that sometimes, φ is for it to be the case that 
restricting attention to things located at some instant t, φ, or φ) 
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Aφ := ∀x(Tx ⊃[φ]x) ⋀	φ 
(Informally: For it to be the case that always, φ is for it to be the case that restricting 
attention to things located at any instant t, φ, and φ) 
 
Call these the Parsons Analyses of the standard tense operators. It is clear that the Parsons 
Analyses avoid the problems for B-theorists generated by Locator – for example, given the 
Parsons Analyses, the sentence  
  
(9) Sometimes, there are many instants 
 
is equivalent to Times. Moreover, the Parsons Analyses avoid the Implausibility Objection: 
given the Parsons Analyses, the sentence  
 
(17) A∃xDx 
 
is equivalent to the false sentence 
 
(40) ∀x(Tx ⊃ ∃y(Dy ⋀ L(y,x)) ⋀	∃xDx 
(Informally: There are dinosaurs located at every instant and there are dinosaurs) 
 
(As above, I do not think the falsehood of (17) is really an advantage of the Parsons 
Analyses, but for dialectical purposes I allow that it is.)  
We have seen that the Parsons Analyses provide B-theorists with a solution to the 
problems generated by Locator that also avoids the Implausibility Objection. It might seem, 
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therefore, that B-theorists should prefer the Parsons Analyses to Redundancy. However, there 
is a good reason for B-theorists to reject the Parsons Analyses:34 given the Parsons Analyses, 
the following sentences are both true: 
 
(9) Sometimes, there are many instants 
 
(41) Sometimes, there is exactly one instant 
 
Thus the Parsons Analyses deliver the unwelcome result that given the B-theory, the number 
of instants varies over time. Moreover, the analyses imply that it is never the case that there 
are exactly n instants for any n greater than 1. (For example, that there are exactly two 
instants is neither true simpliciter nor true when attention is restricted to things located at 
some instant t.) So given the Parsons Analyses, although the number of instants varies over 
time, the number of instants is never precise (except when it is 1). Something has clearly 
gone wrong. In contrast, given Redundancy it is always the case given the B-theory that there 
are many instants, and never the case that there is exactly one instant (or exactly two instants, 
or exactly three instants, and so on).  
 
4.4 Sometimes Introduction 
 
So far we have focused on B-theoretic strategies for avoiding the problems generated by 
Locator which, like the strategy of accepting Redundancy, involve the rejection/modification 
                                                
34 Dorr (Counterparts MS) describes a similar argument against the modal analogue of the Parsons Analyses. 
For a distinct argument against the Parsons Analyses, see Jago (2016, §4).  
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of Locator. We now turn to consider an alternative strategy: to retain Locator, and instead 
reject Sometimes Introduction:35 
 
SOMETIMES INTRODUCTION: φ ⊃	Sφ 
(Informally: Whatever is the case is sometimes the case) 
 
As mentioned in §2, Sometimes Introduction is the temporal analogue of the widely-accepted 
modal axiom T (φ ⊃ ♢φ).36 However, Sometimes Introduction might strike some as less 
obviously true than T. In particular, some might be tempted to reject Sometimes Introduction 
on the grounds that there is a class of ‘atemporal’ (or ‘timeless’) truths such that, for any 
atemporal truth p, the proposition that sometimes p is false.37 Natural candidates for such 
truths are mathematical and logical truths, as well as truths that in some sense ‘concern the 
whole of temporal reality’, such as the true (from a B-theoretic perspective) proposition that 
there are many instants of time. A B-theorist could try to avoid the problems generated by 
Locator by arguing that the sentences which lead to contradiction given Sometimes 
Introduction and Locator (such as Times and Non-instantmates) are sentences which express 
                                                
35 Note that Locator and Sometimes Introduction are independent theses: Sometimes Introduction tells us that 
whenever we have a sentence 𝜑 we can validly infer S𝜑; Locator tells us that we should understand the tense 
operators (including ‘S’) as quantifiers over instants which restrict the individual quantifiers in their scope to 
things located at the relevant instants. Neither thesis implies the other. For example, both Bricker (2001) and 
Parsons (2012) accept T (𝜑 ⊃ ♢𝜑), the modal analogue of Sometimes Introduction, even though both reject M-
Locator. (Indeed, Parsons describes T as an ‘obviously valid pattern of inference’ and names his analysis of ‘♢’ 
the ‘T-preserving analysis’). Similarly, it is not inconsistent to accept Locator and reject Sometimes 
Introduction: in that case, one holds that one cannot always validly infer S𝜑 from 𝜑 and that S𝜑 should be 
understood as equivalent to ‘Restricting attention to thing located at some instant t, 𝜑’. Finally, it is of course 
possible for B-theorists to try to avoid the problems generated by Locator by rejecting both Locator and 
Sometimes Introduction – but such a strategy has no obvious advantages over the strategies contemplated here 
of rejecting one or other of the theses.  
36 Some theorists have contemplated the falsehood of T. For example, Halbach, Leitgeb and Welch (2003) argue 
that those who prefer an interpretation of modal notions as predicates should reject T, and Noonan (1994) 
recommends that modal realists reject T in order to avoid the problems generated by M-Locator.  
37 Some might try to co-opt Fine’s (2005) distinction between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ truth in defence of this 
distinction. See Williamson (2002) for powerful arguments against this approach.  
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atemporal truths in the above sense, and are therefore counterexamples to Sometimes 
Introduction. Call a B-theorist who defends this strategy an Atemporalist B-theorist. 
 An immediate problem with the above strategy is that given that what is not 
sometimes the case is never the case (formally: ¬S𝜑⊃ V𝜑), it follows that for any atemporal 
truth p, p implies never p.38 But is very hard to accept that something is the case and yet 
never the case – that what is never the case is not the case will strike many as a tense-logical 
truth. For example, if the Atemporalist B-theorist argues that Times (‘There are many 
instants’) expresses an atemporal truth, then her view implies 
 
(42) There are many instants and there are never many instants 
 
But that seems strange: if it is never the case that there are many instants, then (surely) it is 
not the case that there are many instants.  
 A natural way for the Atemporalist B-theorist to respond to the above objection is to 
argue that on her view, Locator is true, and therefore on her view, tense operators such as ‘S’, 
‘A’ and ‘V’ are to be understood as implicit quantifiers over instants which restrict the 
quantifiers in their scope to the relevant instants: 
 
Sφ := ∃x(Tx ⋀ [φ]x) 
(Informally: For it to be the case that sometimes, φ is for it to be the case that, 
restricting attention to things located at some instant t, φ) 
 
Aφ := ∀x(Tx ⊃[φ]x) 
                                                
38 In the absence of any convention of which I am aware, I use ‘V’ to represent the tense operator ‘it is never the 
case that’. More generally, V𝜑 is equivalent to ¬S𝜑. Given the inter-definability of ‘S’ and ‘A’, V𝜑 is also 
equivalent to A¬𝜑.  
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(Informally: For it to be the case that always, φ is for it to be the case that, restricting 
attention to things located at any instant t, φ) 
 
Vφ := ¬∃x(Tx ⋀ [φ]x) 
(Informally: For it to be the case that never, φ is for it to be the case that there is no 
instant t such that restricting attention to things located at t, φ) 
 
In that case, on her view (42) above is equivalent to: 
 
(43) There are many instants and there is no instant t such that there are many instants 
located at t 
 
And all B-theorists (including RB-theorists) accept the truth of (43). More generally, the 
Atemporalist B-theorist can argue that the above objection from the truth on her view of 
sentences like (42) fails to take into account what those sentences really mean in the mouth of 
a B-theorist who accepts Locator.39  
However, this response has limited force against the objection. Even if it follows 
given the Atemporalist B-theory that (42) is equivalent to (43), it remains a significant cost of 
the Atemporalist B-theorist’s view that she accepts the truth of sentences such as (42) of the 
form ‘𝜑 ⋀ V𝜑’. After all, it matters just as much given the B-theory as it does given e.g. 
Presentism or the Growing Block Theory which tensed sentences are true. If it did not, then 
(for example) the Implausibilty Objection against the RB-theory from the truth on that view 
of sentences such as  
 
                                                
39 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for drawing my attention to this possible response.  
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(17) A∃xDx 
 
would have no force – RB-theorists could simply respond that on their view, (17) is 
equivalent to  
 
(16) ∃xDx 
 
which is not at all implausible given the B-theory. Similarly, if it didn’t matter which tensed 
sentences were true given the B-theory, there would be no good reason for RB-theorists to 
restrict Redundancy to qualitative sentences – they could instead accept the simpler thesis of 
Total Redundancy: 
 
TOTAL REDUNDANCY: For any sentence φ, Pφ and Fφ are equivalent to φ 
 
But of course, there are excellent reasons for RB-theorists to prefer Redundancy to Total 
Redundancy: given the standard definitions of the tense operators ‘S’ and ‘A’ in terms of ‘P’ 
and ‘F’ (see §1 above), Total Redundancy implies Permanentarianism: 
 
 PERMANENTARIANISM: For any sentence φ, φ ⊃ Aφ  
 
And Permanentarianism is implausible: if it is true, then given that I am sitting it follows that 
 
 (44) I am always sitting 
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Now suppose a Permanentarianist B-theorist tried to defend their view by arguing that given 
the Permanentarianist B-theory, what (44) really means is that I am sitting. It should be clear 
that this response would do little to address the implausibility of the Permanentarianist B-
theory.  
More generally, as we saw above in §1, an important part of the B-theoretic project is 
to provide a ‘metaphysical semantics’ for QTL (Quantified Tense Logic) in the B-theorist’s 
fundamental, operator-free language – and the problems generated by Locator described in §2 
show is that this is not a straightforward task. But the fact that the B-theorist’s fundamental 
language is free of tense operators does not mean that she can simply ignore the 
consequences for QTL of any proposed solution to the problems generated by Locator. In 
particular, the axioms of QTL are no less plausible for being stated in a non-fundamental 
language – and therefore any strategy for avoiding the problems generated by Locator that 
rejects them bears a significant cost.  
 A more plausible way for the B-theorist to reject Sometimes Introduction is to argue 
as follows:40 first, there are distinct tensed and tenseless languages, where if a language L is 
tensed then all of the quantifiers of L are either tensed or equivalent to a disjunction of tensed 
quantifiers. In particular, natural language English (just ‘English’ from now on) is tensed in 
this sense: English quantifiers must always be read as either past, present, or future tensed (or 
as a disjunction of all three). For example, here is Stoneham (2009, 202-3, emphasis added): 
  
The English verbs ‘to exist’ and ‘to be’ must always be tensed: we cannot say that something exists 
without saying more specifically that it does [now], has or will exist. 
 
                                                
40 Parsons (2012, §5) describes and rejects the modal analogue of this strategy.  
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In contrast, tenseless languages contain ‘tenseless quantifiers’: i.e. quantifiers that carry no 
temporal information whatsoever, and so are not even equivalent to a disjunction of tensed 
quantifiers. For example, it is natural to think that the quantifiers of standard first-order 
predicate logic (‘∀’ and ‘∃’) are tenseless in this sense. If so, then standard first-order 
predicate logic is a tenseless language.41  
With the distinction between tensed and tenseless languages in mind, consider (e.g.) 
the argument from Locator, Times and Sometimes Introduction to the contradictory (10): 
 
(10) There is an instant t such that there are many instants located at t 
 
If Times (‘There are many instants’) as it appears in that argument is a sentence of English, 
then given that all English quantifiers are tensed, Times is false: even given the B-theory, it is 
not the case there are now many instants; there is now exactly one instant.42 So Times as it 
appears in that argument must contain a tenseless quantifier, in which case it is a tenseless 
sentence. (If it is not then the argument from Locator, Times and Sometimes Introduction to 
(10) is unsound, and Locator does not generate a problem for B-theorists). But if Times is a 
tenseless sentence, it is not a legitimate substitution-instance of Sometimes Introduction, 
because Sometimes Introduction is a logical truth only when what is substituted for 𝜑 is a 
tensed sentence. Moreover, this does not commit the B-theorist to the truth of sentence (42)  
 
(42) There are many instants and there are never many instants 
 
 
                                                
41 See Stoneham (2009) for an argument that the quantifiers of standard first-order predicate logic must 
ultimately be understood as tensed. See Deasy (forthcoming, Synthese) for a response to this argument.  
42 It is also false according to the B-theory that there are now, were, or will be many instants. 
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because for any tenseless sentence 𝜑, tense operators cannot (meaningfully) be applied to 𝜑 – 
in that sense, tenseless sentences are simply ‘out of the tense game’. More generally, B-
theorists can avoid the problems generated by Locator by arguing that sentences such as 
Times and Non-instantmates are true given the B-theory only if they are tenseless sentences – 
in which case, they are not legitimate substitution-instances of Sometimes Introduction, as 
they cannot (meaningfully) be combined with tense operators such as ‘S’.  
 The problem with the above argument is that it relies on a premise that B-theorists 
should reject, namely, that all English quantifiers are either tensed or equivalent to a 
disjunction of tensed quantifiers. Call this thesis Tensed Quantifiers: 
 
TENSED QUANTIFIERS: All English quantifiers are either tensed or equivalent to a 
disjunction of tensed quantifiers 
 
There are a number of good reasons for B-theorists to reject Tensed Quantifiers. First, Tensed 
Quantifiers implies that it is impossible for B-theorists to state their characteristic theses in 
English (or any other tensed language). For example, as we saw in §2 above, B-theorists 
typically hold that 
 
(6) ∃x(Tx ⋀ x<n ⋀ ∃y(Dy ⋀ L(y,x)))  
(Informally: There are dinosaurs located at a past instant) 
 
which implies 
 
(16) ∃xDx 
(Informally: There are (quantifying unrestrictedly) dinosaurs) 
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However, given Tensed Quantifiers, B-theorists simply cannot assert (16) in English – the 
best they can do is assert the sentence 
 
(45) There are now, were, or will be dinosaurs 
 
But (45) fails to express a characteristically B-theoretic thesis: for example, no Presentist 
would deny that there were dinosaurs, and therefore that (45) is true. It follows that given 
Tensed Quantifiers, the only way for B-theorists to express their characteristic theses is to use 
a language – call it Eternalese – that extends English by the addition of the tenseless 
quantifiers ‘∃’ and ‘∀’ whose domain is distinct from the domains of the past, present and 
future tensed quantifiers of English.43 Eternalese is the ‘home’ language of the B-theory: it is 
only when B-theorists speak Eternalese that they succeed in expressing characteristically B-
theoretic theses.44 Brogaard (2012, 152) describes something like this view: 
 
One might, of course, insist that the ontological commitments of the metaphysical eternalist [i.e. B-
theorist] are inexpressible in English. When philosophers say things like ‘Socrates exists,’ they might 
be taken to speak a regimented language that, in spite of being superficially similar to English, allows 
for additional readings of tensed sentences. 
 
The problem is that it is very hard to believe that B-theorists cannot express their 
                                                
43 Tenseless quantifiers might be characterised as the quantifiers of the fundamental ‘joint carving’ language – 
see especially Sider (2004, §2.2) and Sider (2011).  
44 Note that as well as rejecting Sometimes Introduction, B-theorists who accept Tensed Quantifiers will also 
reject Locator as either as a claim about English or as a claim about Eternalese. However, they can still hold that 
e.g. the English sentence ‘There were dinosaurs’ (with past tensed quantifier ‘there were’) is true iff there are 
dinosaurs located at some past instant (with tenseless quantifier ‘there are’) – and more generally, that all tensed 
facts are ‘grounded in’ tenseless facts. In that sense, such B-theorists can think of Locator as a ‘translation 
manual’ from English to Eternalese.  
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characteristic theses in English. The natural view is that in order to express a true proposition 
concerning the existence simpliciter of dinosaurs, B-theorists simply need to use the 
unrestricted ‘existential’ quantifier in English – in other words, to utter some sentence of 
English with the logical form ‘∃xDx’. And it is not just B-theorists who cannot express their 
characteristic views in English given Tensed Quantifiers. For example, consider the 
sentences: 
 
(46) The universe is expanding 
 
(47) There are two English Queens named ‘Elizabeth’ 
 
Given Tensed Quantifiers, whenever anyone assertively utters (46) or (47) they either express 
a falsehood, or express a truth but are not speaking English. However, that seems wrong: 
surely Neil deGrasse Tyson can use (46) to express a truth – rather than an obvious falsehood 
– without ceasing to speak English, and surely a student of history can use (47) to express a 
truth – rather than an obvious falsehood – without ceasing to speak English.45  
More generally, from the perspective of one who rejects Tensed Quantifiers, the view 
appears to be one according to which there is no genuinely unrestricted quantification in 
English –  but rather that all quantification is restricted either to what there is now, was, or 
will be (or some disjunction of these).46 However, it is very hard to believe that there is no 
unrestricted quantification in English. To use an example of Williamson’s (2003,415-6), 
when Quine (1961) asks ‘What is there?’ and answers ‘Everything’, it is clear that he is both 
speaking English and quantifying unrestrictedly – he is not asking the question ‘What is there 
                                                
45 Brogaard (2012, 152-3) makes a similar argument.  
46 Of course, the defender of Tensed Quantifiers will reject this characterisation of their view – they will say that 
what we are calling ‘unrestricted quantification’ here is really just ‘tenseless quantification’.  
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now?’ (or ‘What is now, was, or will be?’), and he does not answer ‘Everything there is now’ 
(or ‘Everything there is now, was, or will be’).  
Moreover, it is hard to see why we should think that there is no genuinely unrestricted 
quantification in English. After all, the B-theoretic defender of Tensed Quantifiers cannot 
claim that there is no such thing as unrestricted quantification: as a B-theorist, she must allow 
that she can use unrestricted quantifiers (‘tenseless quantifiers’) in order to express her 
theory. But if we can understand and express unrestricted quantifiers, there seems to be no 
good reason to deny that unrestricted quantifiers can be understood and expressed in English. 
Even if unrestricted quantification is in some sense an innovation, English can surely expand 
to encompass expressions that express the relevant notions.47  
   
5. Conclusion 
 
The problems for Modal Realists generated by M-Locator are well-known, and continue to 
receive significant attention from theorists. However, the analogous problems for B-theorists 
has received much less attention. This is surprising, because – as far as I am aware – the B-
theory has significantly more adherents than Modal Realism.  In this paper I have attempted 
to redress the balance somewhat by focusing primarily on the temporal case. In particular, I 
have argued that B-theorists should respond to the problems for their view generated by 
Locator by rejecting Locator in favour of Redundancy, the view that the standard tense 
operators are redundant when the sentences in their scope are qualitative.  
                                                
47 The defender of Tensed Quantifiers might respond to this point as follows: given the Principle of Charity, the 
English expression ‘there is’ cannot be read as expressing the same notion as the ‘tenseless quantifier’ of 
Eternalese, because English speakers typically regard sentences like ‘There are dinosaurs’ as obviously false 
(see, for example, Hirsch 2004). Opponents of Tensed Quantifiers can respond to this point by arguing á la Sider 
(2011) that the unrestricted sense of ‘there is’ is a highly eligible meaning, and that this eligibility outweighs the 
relevant divergence of usage. 
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The arguments in favour of Redundancy are not decisive. But whether or not B-
theorists accept them, what the ‘advanced temporalising’ debate shows is that it matters a 
great deal how B-theorists interpret the standard tense operators. This is something of which 
it is easy to lose sight when one is thinking about the B-theory, because the view is routinely 
characterized as a theory according to which tense is not required in order to provide a 
fundamental description of reality. But even if there are no tense operators (or predicates like 
‘is past’ and ‘is present’) in the B-theorist’s fundamental ‘joint-carving’ language, B-theorists 
still have important questions to answer concerning the ‘tensed’ implications of their view – 
for example, whether or not the B-theory implies Qualitative Permanentarianism. Given that 
this question can be understood as the question of whether, according to the B-theory, there is 
change in the qualitative facts, it is an important question for B-theorists to answer.  
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